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Abstract
With autonomous vehicles (AV) set to integrate further into
regular human traffic, there is an increasing consensus of
treating AV motion planning as a multi-agent problem. How-
ever, the traditional game theoretic assumption of complete
rationality is too strong for the purpose of human driving, and
there is a need for understanding human driving as a bounded
rational activity through a behavioral game theoretic lens. To
that end, we adapt three metamodels of bounded rational be-
havior; two based on Quantal level-k and one based on Nash
equilibrium with quantal errors. We formalize the different
solution concepts that can be applied in the context of hierar-
chical games, a framework used in multi-agent motion plan-
ning, for the purpose of creating game theoretic models of
driving behavior. Furthermore, based on a contributed dataset
of human driving at a busy urban intersection with a total
of ~4k agents and ~44k decision points, we evaluate the be-
havior models on the basis of model fit to naturalistic data,
as well as their predictive capacity. Our results suggest that
among the behavior models evaluated, modeling driving be-
havior as pure strategy NE with quantal errors at the level of
maneuvers with bounds sampling of actions at the level of
trajectories provides the best fit to naturalistic driving behav-
ior.
INTRODUCTION
Motion planners are a critical component of autonomous ve-
hicle (AV) architecture, and the decisions made by the algo-
rithms impact the safety of road users, such as pedestrians,
cyclists, and other human-driven vehicles. Traditional ap-
proaches to motion planning have typically treated the prob-
lem as a single-agent problem; in this perspective, a vehicle
interacts with the environment (in simulation or on-field set-
ting), possibly with the help of recorded human-driven tra-
jectories, and plans its actions by optimizing over its objec-
tives while taking into account the dynamic obstacles in the
vicinity (Schwarting, Alonso-Mora, and Rus 2018; Ilievski
et al. 2019). However, in reality human driving is a complex
system with a symbiotic relation among agents, where ac-
tions of a vehicle influence the future actions of other road
users and vice versa. More recently, there has been a focus
towards treating motion planning of AVs as a multi-agent
Copyright © 2021, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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problem with game-theoretic solutions to AV decision mak-
ing (Fisac et al. 2019; Sadigh et al. 2016; Camara et al. 2018;
Li et al. 2018). Such approaches can account for heteroge-
neous objectives in a group of vehicles in a traffic scene
and identify equilibrium solutions that guide the actions of
the AV. Given that the movement dynamics of a vehicle is
in continuous domain, it is intuitive to model the dynam-
ics as a differential game, an approach adopted by multiple
models in the literature (Fridovich-Keil et al. 2019; Sadigh
et al. 2016; Wang et al. 2019). However, the applicability
of such games as a general purpose planner is limited by
the trade off between the computational burden and expres-
sivity; cases where efficient solutions exist in a multi-agent
setting restrict the behavior of the agents to only linear dy-
namics (Fridovich-Keil et al. 2019). As an alternative, (Fisac
et al. 2019) models the planning problem as a hierarchical
game where the game is decomposed into two levels; a long-
horizon strategic game that can model richer agent behavior
and a short-horizon tactical game with simplified informa-
tion structure. Although hierarchical games are well suited
and show promising results for planning in AV, for the mod-
els to be applicable in real world situations, we need to un-
derstand how well the stationary concepts in the game match
naturalistic human driving behavior. It is well known that in
many realistic settings, the theoretical fixed point of Nash
equilibrium is a poor predictor of human behavior (Goeree
and Holt 2001); therefore, it is necessary to investigate if the
same is true for human driving behavior too. In absence of
that information, we do not know what to optimize for.
Behavioral game theory provides a framework to analyse de-
cision making in a naturalistic setting and models of behav-
ior that often have higher predictive power than Nash equi-
libria (Camerer 2011). A key element in behavioral game
theory is bounded rationality, where the conventional game-
theoretic notion of agents as fully rational is relaxed to al-
low for sub-optimal behavior. Such behavior may arise from
limitations in cognitive reasoning, or error-prone actions
(Samuelson 1995). Driving is a cognitively demanding job
that requires situational awareness and sophisticated visuo-
motor co-ordination, added on to individual habits, biases,
and preferences; and it is not hard to imagine that driving at
its core is a bounded rational activity. Consequently, it be-
comes essential for AV game theoretic planners to be able to
characterize the bounded rational behavior in human driv-
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ing; for example, if humans are prone to making error in
judgement when the signal is about to turn red from amber at
a busy intersection, then the AV planner should take that into
account since the safety of the AV decision is conditioned on
the error made by the human driver. Therefore, developing
a game-theoretic planner for an AV is a multi-step process,
broadly involving a) selection of the right behavior model
and equilibrium concepts for other road agents, b) estimation
of the parameters of the model, and c) generation of a safe
maneuver and trajectory after accounting for the model and
its parameters. In this paper, we primarily focus on the first
two aspects. Wright and Leyton-Brown developed a general
framework of analysing and estimating parameters of popu-
lar behavioral game theory models based on observations of
game play focussing on two models of behavior, i.e., Quan-
tal Level-k (QLk) and Poisson-Cognitive Hierarchy (P-CH)
(Wright and Leyton-Brown 2012). Although QLk and P-CH
do not capture all types of bounded rationality that one can
think of in the case of human driving, such as the ones that
arise from sampling the actions of other agents, the frame-
work developed in (Wright and Leyton-Brown 2012) nev-
ertheless can be applied to a wider set of behavior models
including the ones we develop in this paper.
In this paper we make the following contributions: (i) We
formalize the concept of a hierarchical game that connects
research in traffic psychology with motion planning for au-
tonomous driving. (ii) We extend three models of behavior
from behavioral game theory, two based on Quantal level-k
and one based on Nash equilibrium with quantal errors, and
demonstrate the possible solution concepts that can be ap-
plied to hierarchical games. (iii) In order to better understand
strategic and non-strategic decision making in human driv-
ing, we compare 25 game theoretic models based on a cross
sectional study of human drivers at a busy urban intersec-
tion with a total of 3913 agents and 43765 decision points.
We make this dataset, which is one of the largest multi-agent
behavior dataset of human driving, publicly available as a
contribution.
Hierarchical games
Prior to recent focus in autonomous driving, there has been
considerable body of research on modeling driving behav-
ior within the field of traffic psychology with a long history
of treating driving behavior as a hierarchical model (Keski-
nen et al. 2004; Van der Molen and Bo¨tticher 1988; Lewis-
Evans 2012; Michon 1985). A primary motivation of a hi-
erarchical decomposition is that drivers have different mo-
tivations and risk judgements in each level of the hierarchy,
and the functional decomposition into a hierarchical system
allows for modelling the risk and safety considerations sepa-
rately at each level. Motion planners in autonomous vehicles
also follow a similar hierarchical pattern of decomposition; a
high level route planner plan is given to a behavior planner,
which sets up the tactical maneuvers for a lower level trajec-
tory planner, which in turn generates the trajectory profile
for the vehicle controller after respecting its nonholonomic
constraints. In addition to the motivation mentioned earlier,
treating the problem of planning as a hierarchical system is
also driven by computational efficiency as previously shown
Figure 1: Illustration of a simultaneous move game modeling inter-
section navigation. A hierarchical game is instantiated every ∆tp
seconds with action plan of∆th seconds.
in (Fisac et al. 2019).
In a multi-agent setting, this means that the planning prob-
lem has to be extended to the notion of a hierarchical game,
which we formalize further below. A hierarchical game is
formulated by
• Set of N agents indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..N}.
• A set of K levels indexed by κ ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..K}.
• Set of actions Ai,κ available to each agent i at level κ.
• A strategy si for agent i is a K-tuple si =
(ai,1, ai,2, .., ai,K) where ai,κ ∈ Ai,κ and the strategy
space of si is
∏
κ∈K
Ai,κ.
• A set of states Xi of agent i in level 1, and an initial map-
ping function fi,1 : Xi → P(Ai,1) that maps the initial
state of the agent to the available actions in level 1, where
P(·) is the power set.
• Set-valued functions fi,κ :
κ−1∏
j=1
Ai,j → P(Ai,κ) for each
agent i that maps a partial strategy (ai,1, ai,2, .., ai,κ−1) to
P(Ai,κ) and gives the set of available actions to i in level
κ > 1 for the partial strategy till level κ− 1.
• Set of N pay-off (utility) functions U = {ui(si, s−i)},
where −i refers to all agents other than i.
The hierarchical game imposes a total ordering in actions
Ai = {Ai,1, Ai,2, .., Ai,K} of a given agent, and along with
fi,κ induces a game tree, as shown in Fig. 1. The frequency
at which a hierarchical game is instantiated (∆tp) and the
time horizon of each strategy (∆th) are exogenous to the
model. Each node is labeled ni,κ,j , where i and κ are the
agent and level indices, and j is the node identifier within
level κ. This general formulation of a hierarchical game does
not prescribe a fixed information structure, and allows the
designer to set an information structure that is appropriate to
the environment and situation they want to model. For exam-
ple, (Fisac et al. 2019) model a lane change scenario where
an AV merges into a lane occupied by a human driven ve-
hicle as a Stackelberg game, with the AV being the leader
and the human driven vehicle responding to the action of
the AV. In situations where assignment of a leader and a fol-
lower is unclear or that assumption is too strong, the agents
might not have perfect information on the state of the play.
Fig. 1 illustrates a 2-agent 2-level scenario as an example
where an AV (indexed as 1) executes a free right turn on red
at a signalized intersection (in a situation similar to id:14 in
Fig. 2), while a human driven vehicle (id:26 and re-indexed
as 2 in Fig. 1) approaches cross path from left to right. The
AV can either decide to turn (T) or wait (W) for the cross
path vehicle to pass, i.e., f1,1(X1) = A1,1 = {T,W}. The
human driven vehicle (id:26) can either slow down (D) or
choose not to slow down (U), f2,1(X2) = A2,1 = {D,U}.
Since either agent does not have perfect information about
what the other agent is about to do next, agent 2 does not
know whether they are in node n2,1,1 or n2,1,2 (connected by
the information set I(1)). This imperfection of information is
also reflected at the trajectory level (level 2 actions), where
each agent can only distinguish between the nodes in level 2
that follow from their own chosen actions in level 1, but not
from the ones that follow from the other agent’s level 1 deci-
sion (I(2)-I(5)). It becomes apparent from this structure that
the game has no proper subgame, and the game reduces to a
simultaneous move game. It is well understood that a way to
solve such games is by reduction to normal form. However,
as we shall see, the hierarchical game has additional con-
straints that allow solving the game in Fig. 1 also through
backward induction. To designate the nodes where utilities
accumulate at each level in the backward induction process,
we label a set of nodes in each level κ as level roots L(κ) =
{ni,κ,j |parent(ni,κ,j) /∈ Nκ} where Nκ is the set of nodes
in level κ. In other words, the set of level roots contain nodes
in each level κ whose parent is not in level κ. Therefore,
L(1) = {n1,1,1} and L(2) = {n1,2,1, n1,2,2, n1,2,3, n1,2,4}.
Algorithm 1 shows the standard backward induction process
adapted to the hierarchical game. The algorithm starts at the
Algorithm 1: Backward induction for a hierarchical
game
Result: S∗1 , V ∗1
1 for κ := K;κ = 1; κ := κ− 1 do
2 for n ∈ L(κ) do
3 S∗κ,n, V
∗
κ,n ← solve Gκ(
N∏
i=1
fi,κ(σi(n)),
4 κ = K?U ;V ∗κ+1,L(κ+1))
5 end
6 end
bottom most level (K) and recursively moves up the tree by
solving the level games Gκ at every level. At each level, a
simultaneous move level game Gκ is instantiated from each
node in L(κ). These level games are constructed by first ex-
tracting σi(n), which gives the partial pure strategy for agent
i that lies on the branch from the root node of the game
tree L(1) to node n ∈ L(κ). fi,κ gives the available ac-
tions for each agent i in the current level κ, and these actions
form the domain of available strategies in the level game Gκ.
The utilities depend on the level of the game; for level game
Gκ=K the utilities are same as the game utility U , whereas
(x, y)O
Figure 2: A snapshot of the intersection traffic scene. Representa-
tive trajectories based on the three sampling schemes over a R3.
The figure shows the path (R2) projection of the trajectories.
for level games Gκ<K are solved based on the game values
V ∗κ+1,L(κ+1) from the game Gκ+1 solved in the previous it-
eration. Note that the pseudocode shows only the case where
a single solution and game value (S∗κ,n, V
∗
κ,n) is propagated
up the hierarchy. In the case of multiple solutions for the
level games, the strategies and values have to be tracked and
repeated for each solution. The solutions and game value
S∗κ,n, V
∗
κ,n depend on the solution concept used for the indi-
vidual level game, and this is discussed in detail later under
Solution concepts.
One can see that the backward induction process is very sim-
ilar, if not same as solving for subgame perfect equilibria in
multi-stage games with stages being replaced by levels in
the hierarchy (Tadelis 2013). However, we cannot call it that
since the level games are not subgames in the game tree.
The reason why the backward induction works though is be-
cause the mapping functions fi,κ eliminate strategies for ev-
ery agent i that are not direct successors of the partial strate-
gies σi(n) ·σ−i(n), essentially breaking any information set
within a level κ that spans across two separate level roots in
L(κ). More intuitively, this mimics the elimination of hypo-
thetical strategies where in level 1 a vehicle may think about
slowing down, but in level 2 chooses a trajectory that speeds
up; and the fact that this cannot happen is part of the com-
mon knowledge among the agents in the game.
Game structure
In this section, we describe the details of the game struc-
ture used in our study, including the number of agents, ac-
tions/strategies, and utilities.
Relevant agents and available actions. Since we are in-
terested in investigating decision making in the most crit-
ical tasks at a signalized intersection (such as unprotected
left turns and right turns on red), at each time step ∆tp=1s,
we setup a hierarchical game with an action plan horizon of
∆th=5s into the future from the perspective of each vehicle
that is turning left or right in the scenario. For example, in
the snapshot of Fig. 2, the black dashed line shows the game
from the perspective of the vehicle 14, which is turning right.
In each game, we include relevant vehicles that are in active
conflict with the reference vehicle along with the conflicting
vehicle’s leading vehicle. Pedestrian actions are not modeled
explicitly in the game tree; however, their influence is mod-
eled in the utility structure of the game, which is described
later in the section. Each game is a N -player 2-level hier-
archical game where level 1 actions for each agent are high
level maneuvers that are relevant to the task under execution,
and level 2 actions are the corresponding trajectories. We
setup the set of maneuvers with the help of a rule engine that
takes into account the task of the vehicle and its situational
state (position, velocity, etc.). The complete list of level 1
actions is given in the supplementary material (S1). Level
2 actions (Ai,2) are trajectories that are generated based on
the actions in level 1. To generate the trajectories for each
vehicle, we use a lattice sampling based trajectory genera-
tion similar to one presented in (Ziegler and Stiller 2009).
First a set of lattice endpoints are sampled on R2 cartesian
co-ordinate centered on the vehicle’s current position. Each
lattice sample point on R2 is then extended with a temporal
lattice which is re-sampled to form the final lattice points in
R3 that contain the (x, y) positions and the target velocity at
each lattice point after accounting for acceleration and jerk
limits of passenger vehicles (Bae, Moon, and Seo 2019). Fi-
nally, the sampled lattice points are connected with a smooth
cubic spline representing the vehicle trajectory.
Since the trajectory generation is in continuous space with
infinite actions for the drivers to reason over, combined with
the time constraints to make a decision (which is in the or-
der of milliseconds), the situation is ripe for bounded ratio-
nality to be in play. Osborne and Rubinstein takes a view
of bounded rationality that emerges from agents’ employ-
ing a mental process to sample other agents’ actions and
respond based on the imagined outcome of those samples
(Osborne and Rubinstein 1998). In our case, this is akin to
a vehicle sampling a set of trajectories of other agents and
responding in accordance to the sampled trajectories. Natu-
rally, one may imagine that some sampling procedures make
more sense than others. We now briefly mention the sam-
pling procedures used in our experiments, and the intuitive
reasoning behind each.
At each time step when the game tree is instantiated, agents
observe the current attributes (such as position, velocity and
acceleration) of other relevant agents in the game tree. In the
most basic case, an agent i may sample a single trajectory
(level 2 action) of every agent −i that that they, i.e., i, think
is most representative of the level 1 action of the agent they
are currently reasoning over. To construct the trajectory sam-
ple, we select lattice endpoints along the lane centerline and
use a piecewise constant acceleration model to generate the
final trajectory. In the subsequent sections, we refer to this
sampling scheme that produces a single trajectory as S(1)
sampling. With a little more cognitive bandwidth, along with
the S(1) trajectory sample, they can also sample trajectories
that form the extreme ends of the bounded level-2 action
space of other agents. These trajectories are bounded spa-
tially by the lane boundaries and temporally by the upper
and lower bounds on the velocity limits of the level 1 ac-
tion they correspond to. We refer to this scheme as bounds
sampling S(1 + B). This set of trajectories indicate what
other agents might do in normative (i.e. following the rules
as captured by the piecewise constant acceleration model)
as well as in the extreme case but still within the physical
limitations of the vehicle. The final sampling scheme lies in
between the two schemes. Similar to S(1 +B), this scheme
includes the S(1) trajectory; however, the rest of the trajec-
tories are sampled from a multivariate Gaussian distribution
with µ = [xS(1), yS(1), vS(1)]> and an unit diagonal covari-
ance matrix, where (xS(1), yS(1), vS(1)) is the lattice end-
point corresponding to the S(1) trajectory. We refer to this
scheme as S(1 +G) and the samples include the normative
behavior that comes from S(1) along with variations in the
path and velocity of the vehicle but not to the extremes that
were captured in the S(1 +B) scheme.
Utilities. To determine the utility structure, we draw from
motivational aspects of driver behavior modelling in traffic
psychology literature (Summala 1988). In general, driving
motivations can be broadly classified into inhibitory and ex-
citatory. Whereas excitatory motivations drive a driver to
make progress towards reaching the destination, inhibitory
motivations are the balancing factors that account for miti-
gating crashes and mental stress. In our case, the degree of
progress a driver can make based on a selected trajectory ai,2
is the excitatory utility uv exc(ai,2) as determined by the tra-
jectory length ‖ai,2‖, uv exc(ai,2) = min(‖ai,2‖dg , 1), where
dg is a constant and can be interpreted as the distance to
goal or crossing the intersection. Inhibitory utility is based
on the minimum distance gap of the trajectory to other ve-
hicles uv inh as well as respecting pedestrian’s right of way
up inh. The final form of the utility function is
ui(ai,2, a−i,2) =
W · [uv inh(ai,2, a−i,2) up inh(ai,2) uv exc(ai,2)]>
uv inh(ai,2, a−i,2)
=
∫
erf
[
d(ai,2, a−i,2)− θ
σ
√
2
]
N (θ; d∗ai,2,a−i,2 , σ)dθ
Sigmoidal functions are a popular family of functions
that map a safety surrogate metric, e.g., distance gap
d(ai,2, a−i,2), into an utility interval (Fishburn 1970). For
uv inh, we first fix a minimum safe distance gap d∗ai,2,a−i,2
based on the task (left turn, right turn, etc.) of the agents
in the game. The value of the safe distance gap deter-
mines the location θ of the sigmoidal function (erf). How-
ever, since the conception of what is considered safe may
vary in a population of drivers, we let θ to be a random
variable that is normally distributed with µ = d∗ai,2,a−i,2
and constant variance σ determining the scale of the sig-
moidal function. The choice of erf as the sigmoidal func-
tion is a mathematical convenience since the Gaussian inte-
gral of the erf in uv inh(ai,2, a−i,2) evaluates to another sig-
moidal erf(
d(ai,2,a−i,2)−d∗ai,2,a−i,2
2σ ) (cf. supplementary ma-
terial S2). up inh is a step function over [-1,1] such that
up inh(ai,2) = −1 if ai,2 is a trajectory that does not wait
for a pedestrian when the pedestrian is in the vicinity having
a right of way, or is on the crosswalk to be traversed; and 1
otherwise.W is the weight parameter that combines the in-
hibitory and excitatory utilities together to produce a single
real value. Utilities for the actions in G1 can be calculated as
follows. ui(ai,1, a−i,1) = V ∗2,η(i), where η is the leaf node
of the branch ai,1, a−i,1 and V ∗2,η(i) is the utility of agent i
following the pure strategy response a∗i,2 as determined by
a given solution concept, which we describe in detail in the
next section.
Solution concepts
A key element that influences solution concepts in games is
the manner in which each agent reasons over the strategies
of other agents. In non-strategic behavior models, agents do
not explicitly model other agents in the game and respond
solely on the basis of their own utility structure (Wright and
Leyton-Brown 2020). Strategic agents, on the other hand,
perform some reasoning over the strategies of other agents
and respond accordingly.
The first category of behavior models we consider is the
Quantal level-k (QLk) model (Wright and Leyton-Brown
2012). QLk models the population of agents as a mix of
strategic and non-strategic agents, with strategic agents hav-
ing an iterated cognitive hierarchy of reasoning. Strategic
agents in QLk use Quantal Best Response (QBR) func-
tion, often expressed as a logit response piQBRi (ai, s−i, λ) =
exp [λ·ui(ai,s−i)]
Σ
a
′
i
exp [λ·ui(a′i,s−i)]
, where s−i represent the pure or mixed
strategies of other agents and λ is the precision parameter
that can account for errors in agent response with respect
to utility differences1. When λ→ 0, the mixed response is a
uniform random distribution, whereas λ→∞makes the re-
sponse equivalent to best response. Level-0 agents are non-
strategic (NS) agents who choose their actions uniformly
at random, whereas Level-1 agents are strategic (S) agents
who believe that the population consists solely of Level-
0 agents, and their response is a QBR response to Level-0
agents’ actions. In the original QLk model, level-0 agents
follow an uniform distribution mixed strategy; however, in
our case we use an expanded definition of level-0 agents pre-
sented in (Wright and Leyton-Brown 2014), where instead
of an uniform distribution, the level-0 agents’ strategies fol-
low more intuitive yet non-strategic response, such as best
response (BR) or maxmin (MM) response. We believe that
the expanded definition of the level-0 agents suit our situ-
ation much better, since it is unrealistic to expect a driver
to choose actions purely at random from their available ac-
tions. Even with this expanded definition, these are still non-
strategic since agent responses depend purely on their own
utilities and do not rely on a strategic reasoning over other
agents’ utilities (Wright and Leyton-Brown 2020)
In a hierarchical game, since the agent strategies are factored
1 In this formulation, the symbols si and ai are strategies and ac-
tions of a game in a general sense, and not related to the symbols
used specifically in the formulation of hierarchical games earlier.
QL0 QL1 PNE-QE
G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2
NS NS S+NS NS S NS
Table 1: Distribution of strategic (S) and non-strategic (NS) behav-
ior in level games G1 and G2 in three metamodels QL0, QL1, and
PNE-QE.
into levels si = (ai,1, ai,2), the manner in which an agent
reasons over strategies in one level might not be the same
as the reasoning process in another level. Therefore, instead
of a single solution concept in the game of Fig. 1, the level
games G2 can have a different solution concept than the one
in game G1. In our models, we let agents have a cognitively
less demanding non-strategic response in G2, and a more de-
liberative strategic response in G1. This choice is similar to
one taken in (Fisac et al. 2019), and reflects the natural pro-
cess where it is easier for drivers to reason strategically over
the strategy space of discrete maneuvers than over the space
of infinitely many trajectories.
We consider two metamodels of behavior under QLk: QL0
and QL1. We refer to them as metamodels, since they can be
further refined based on the choice of response function and
sampling schemes to create concrete models. In QL0 mod-
els, we restrict the population to be solely level-0 responders
in both G1 and G2. In QL1, the population consist of a mix of
level-0 and level-1 responders in G1 and level-0 responders
in G2. (Table 1)
For models of non-strategic behavior, we use two re-
sponse functions; best response (BR) and best worst-case or
maxmin response (MM). The model of BR is:
a∗i,κ = argmax∀ai,κ,a−i,κ
ui(ai,κ, a−i,κ) (1)
pii(ai,κ)
=
exp[λi · ui(ai,κ, argmax∀a−i,κ ui(ai,κ, a−i,κ))]
Σ∀ai,κ exp[λi · ui(ai,κ, argmax∀a−i,κ ui(ai,κ, a−i,κ))]
(2)
where a∗i is the pure strategy utility maximizing action for
i. The model for non-strategic MM response is:
a∗i,κ = argmax∀ai,κ
argmin
∀a−i,κ
ui(ai,κ, a−i,κ) (3)
pii(ai,κ)
=
exp[λi · ui(ai,κ, argmin∀a−i,κ ui(ai,κ, a−i,κ))]
Σ∀ai,κ exp[λi · ui(ai,κ, argmin∀a−i,κ ui(ai,κ, a−i,κ))]
(4)
Equations 2 and 4 are relaxations that translate the pure
strategy action to a noisy response pii(ai,κ) based on the pre-
cision parameter λi and sensitivity to i’s utility difference
with respect to opponent actions that maximizes i’s utility
for BR and minimizes for MM.
In QL1 metamodel, the population consists of a mix of level-
0 and level-1 agents. Level-0 agents in this population fol-
low non-strategic behavior as formulated earlier and level-
1 agents best responds quantaly to level-0 agents’ behav-
ior. With the expanded definition of level-0 agents as non-
strategic bounded rational agents, there is a design choice
to be made on what level-1 agents believe about level-0
agents. They can either consider level-0 agents bounded ra-
tional having mixed response of Equations 2 and 4, or level-
1 agents can consider level-0 agents to be pure strategy ra-
tional responders based on Equations 1 and 3. We choose
the later to align with the original QLk model, where agents
modeling other agents as bounded rational agents are ob-
served only at a higher cognitive level (level-2 and above).
In QLk models, mixed population is modeled as uniform
population of bimodal mixture behavior. Therefore, if the
proportion of level-0 and level-1 agents is α and 1 − α re-
spectively, then the QL1 model response in G1 is the mixed
strategy response
piQL1i (ai,1) = α ·piQL0i (ai,1) + (1−α) ·piQBRi (ai,1, a∗−i,1, λi)
(5)
where piQL0i (ai,1) is the left hand side of the equation 2 or
4 and a∗−i,1 is the solution set to equations 1 or 3 for each of
the other agents.
The final metamodel we consider is a generalization of pure
strategy Nash equilibrium with noisy response. In this meta-
model, agents follow a non-strategic model in G2, and a
strategic model in G1 as described below.
a∗i,1 = argmax∀ai,1
ui(ai,1, a
∗
−i,1) (6)
pii(ai,1)
=
exp[−λi ·min∀(a∗i,1,a∗−i,1)(u∗i − ui(ai,1, a∗−i,1))]
Σ∀ai,1 exp[−λi ·min∀(a∗i,1,a∗−i,1)(u∗i − ui(ai,1, a∗−i,1))]
(7)
where u∗i = ui(a
∗
i,1, a
∗
−i,1). In the above model, agents
respond according to pure strategy Nash equilibria a∗i,1, but
in error may choose actions ai,1 /∈ a∗i,1 based on the sen-
sitivity to the difference in the utility of the action and an
equilibrium action. We refer to this model as pure strategy
Nash equilibria with quantal errors (PNE-QE). The formu-
lation is similar to Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE),
yet with key differences. In QRE, strategic reasoning occurs
in a space of mixed responses and the precision parameter
is part of common knowledge in the game. In our model,
reasoning over opponent strategies is in pure strategy ac-
tion space and the precision parameter is endogenous to each
agent; therefore, when an agent reasons about the strategies
of other agents, their parameters do not play a role (Craw-
ford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri 2013).
Based on the choice of the metamodel, the response func-
tion, and the sampling scheme, we get 25 different behavior
models (B), cf. Fig. 3, which we evaluate in the next section.
Estimation of game parameters. Our dataset contains
instances of D (~23k) hierarchical games, instantiated at
a frequency of 1s with the state variables Xi along with
the observed strategy soi = (a
o
i,1, a
o
i,2) for every agent in
each game. For a game g ∈ {(Gκ, b, j)|κ ∈ {1, 2}, b ∈
B, j = {1, ...,D}} identified by the level game, the behav-
ior model b, and the game index j, we note the errors in ac-
tions with respect to the pure strategy responses in the games
as ∆Ug = {i,g|i,g = min∀a∗
i,(g)
[ui(a
∗
i,(g), a
∗
−i,(g)) −
ui(a
o
i,(g), a
∗
−i,(g))]}, where a∗i,(g) are the solutions to Equa-
tions 1 or 3 for non-strategic models and 6 for PNE-QE
model. We verified the existence of pure strategy NE for
all G1 games in D. ∆Ug follows an exponential distri-
bution based on the game’s precision parameter for non-
strategic and PNE-QE models, and a mixed exponential dis-
tribution (5) for QL1 in G1. We model the precision pa-
rameters λi,g in individual game g to be a function of the
agents’ state vector Xi,g in the game. Therefore, to esti-
mate the value of λi,g we fit a generalized linear model
glm(i,g ∼ βXi,g)|∆Ug with Gamma(k = 1) family and in-
verse link, which models i,g as an exponentially distributed
random variable with E[i,g] = 1λi,g and Var[i,g] =
1
λ2i,g
.
β is the model co-efficient, solved through maximum like-
lihood estimate based on the data in ∆Ug . The prediction
of the glm model gives the mean and standard error of λ−1i,g
based on the state observation Xi,g . For the mixed exponen-
tial distribution in QL1 model, once we estimate the indi-
vidual precision parameters of 5, we use iterative gradient
ascent to solve for α by maximizing the likelihood function
Σ∀aoi,1 ln(pi
QL1
i (a
o
i,1)).
Experiments
In our experiment we study naturalistic human driving be-
havior and based on the structure of the hierarchical game,
we evaluate which behavior model captures human driving
better, both in terms of model fit and predictive accuracy.
Our dataset contains traffic observations collected from a
drone camera at a busy urban intersection during mid-day
traffic. The dataset contains a total of 3649 vehicles and
264 pedestrians, including their centimetre-accurate trajec-
tory estimates. We analyse the decision making in right turn-
ing and left turning vehicles, which results in a total of 23119
hierarchical games. In our experiments, we study behaviors
after settingW = [0.25 0.5 0.25], thereby giving more
importance to pedestrian inhibitory actions and set the value
of dg = 100 m. In particular we answer the following re-
search questions:
RQ1 Which solution concept provides the best explanation for
the observed naturalistic data?
RQ2 How do state factors influence the precision parameters in
the games?
RQ3 How does the choice of the response function in the lower
level game G2 affect the higher level solutions in G1?
RQ1. We address this question in three ways; with respect
to the (i) parameter values in the model, (ii) predictive ac-
curacy in unseen data, and (iii) model fit. Fig. 3 shows the
mean and standard error of λi,g estimates in level games G1
for the set of behavior models. Models are indexed by their
metamodel followed by the choices of response functions
in G1:G2 followed by the sampling scheme used in G2. For
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Figure 3: Comparison of the models based on precision parameters
(λ), fit (AIC values noted in brackets), and predictive accuracy (log
likelihood of observations in test data after 30 runs).
PNE-QE models, the response function in G2 is omitted for
S(1) sampling since the hierarchical game only consists of
G1 games; and in those cases each agent has a single choice
under each level-2 roots. We perform our analysis of RQs 1
and 2 based on G1, and discuss the impact of the choice of
G2 solution concepts as a part of RQ3. Higher λ values indi-
cate agents following a strategy that is closer to pure strategy
responses of the models. For QL1 models, Fig. 3 shows the
estimates of the precision parameter of level-1 responders.
The mean and standard deviaton of the proportion of level-
1 responders in Ql1 models are α = 0.519 ± 0.02. Over-
all, PNE-QE:BRS(1+B)PNE-QE model with best response in
G2 with bounds sampling) show highest value of the pre-
cision parameter (λ = 190.8 ± 0.57). Next, we evaluate
model fit using Akaike information criterion (AIC) values,
which are noted in the figure in brackets. PNE-QE mod-
els with bounds sampling of trajectories have lowest AIC
values (-185.87 and -187.34 for PNE-QE:BRS(1+B)nd PNE-
QE:MMS(1+B)espectively), indicating the best fit among the
models based on the criteria.
Alternatively, model selection can also be guided by their
predictive power in unseen situations. For evaluation based
on this criterion, we use random subsampling with 75:25
training and testing split and 30 runs. The model parameters
are estimated based on the observations in the training set,
and the predictive accuracy is measured on the basis of the
log likelihood of the observed actions in the testing set. Fig.
3 shows the log likelihood of the observed G1 actions in the
testing set as predicted by each model, along with the stan-
dard deviation. In general, we observe that QL1 and PNE-
QE models have slightly better predictive accuracy than QL0
models. However, the difference between models are not as
pronounced as in the case of other metrics, such as AIC and
precision parameter. Overall, the results indicate that based
on the three evaluation criteria combined (precision param-
eter, AIC, and predictive performance), pure strategy Nash
equilibria, especially with bounds sampling of trajectories,
is still a good model of decision making at the level of ma-
neuvers, but with a noisy response; and this noise can be
modelled with a quantal error model that is sensitive to the
utility difference to a sample NE.
RQ2. In this research question we study the impact of the
state factors on the precision parameter. We rank each state
factor based on their relative impact on the precision param-
eter based on the fitted glm (the list of state factors are de-
scribed in supplementary material S3). The factors that are
found to have the most impact are Segment (the area of the
intersection the vehicle is in) and the state of the traffic light.
When vehicles are on a right turn execution segment, they
show an average λ increase of 165.62. Compared to the left
turn task, right turns are more self-paced (in North Amer-
ica), where a driver has more time available to perceive their
surroundings and execute the turn when it is safe to do so,
which may be one reason for the higher precision. Similarly,
when the traffic light is amber or red, there is an increase
in λ of 136 compared to when the light is green. Other than
right turning vehicles, most movement in amber or red light
are vehicles slowing down to stop at red light or left turning
vehicles finishing executing their turn. In these situations,
given that the severity of making a wrong decision, we ob-
serve higher rationality in drivers. These results show that
there is much more variation within individual models de-
pending on situational circumstances (as indicated by the
impact of state factors) compared to the variation in mean
λ values across different models.
RQ3. Within the three behavior metamodels, we investigate
the impact of the choice of the response function in G2 on the
precision parameter in G1. For QL0:BR models, the choice
of response function in G2 is statistically non-significant
(Dunn’s test, p-value=0.19). However, for all other models,
the choice of G2 response function is significant, and choos-
ing a best response function at the level of trajectories results
in a higher value of λ in level games G1 compared to maxmin
response for all the models.
Conclusion
We formalize the concept of a hierarchical game and develop
the various solution concepts that can be applied to a hierar-
chical game by adapting popular behavioral game theoretic
metamodels (QLk and PNE-QE). We evaluated the behavior
models based on a large contributed dataset of human driv-
ing at a busy urban intersection. Our results show that among
the behavior models evaluated, modeling driving behavior as
pure strategy NE with quantal errors at the level of maneu-
vers along with bounds sampling of trajectories provides the
best fit to naturalistic driving behavior. Additionally, right
turning vehicles demonstrate a higher precision in their be-
havior with respect to the behavior models, than left-turning
ones and there is a high impact of situational circumstances
on the models. We identify two main directions for future
work. The first one is to analyze the sensitivity of the solu-
tions of the behavior models to different weightsW of the
excitatory and inhibitory motivations and to addition of so-
cial utility norms (Schwarting et al. 2019). The second one
is to perform a more extensive analysis of the effect of situ-
ational context on the behavior models to determine which
models work better under what circumstances.
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Ethics statement
Research in self-driving cars or autonomous vehicles has
broad impact on transportation and society in general. Mem-
bers of the public have a stake in the development of AVs
since the algorithms and the processes that go into the devel-
opment of AVs impact the safety of everyone as road users.
The main goal of our paper is to understand human driving
behavior in a multi-agent setting in order to make it easier
to evaluate how decisions made by AV motion planning al-
gorithms impact other road users. Although the approaches
developed in the paper are well suited to be used for the pur-
pose of verification and testing of AV motion planners, there
are ethical impacts that should be taken into consideration
while applying the models.
First, driving behaviors that fall under errors or off-
equilibrium behaviors are considered off-equilibrium only
with respect to a specific utility structure. Our ability to
predict the utility of motivations at an individual level is
severely limited, and this limitation needs to be acknowl-
edged and taken into account. For example, the quantita-
tive value an individual driver, for whom their car is a vital
commodity for their source of livelihood, assigns to driving
safely, (as modelled through surrogate safety metics) may
be very different from another individual who owns multi-
ple cars and uses their vehicle only for casual commute. In
addition, there are several factors, such as, socioeconomic
status, disability, access to insurance, etc., that play a role in
shaping the driving behavior of an individual.
Secondly, as shown in the paper, off-equilibrium behaviors
that we observe in the behavior models can be modelled as
an exponential distribution; i.e., the probability of behaviors
that lie away from the equilibrium reduces the further the
behavior is from on-equilibrium behavior. Since we can es-
timate the parameters of this distribution, it may be tempting
to evaluate models solely through quantitative risk metrics
that are derived from this distribution. However, along with
such an analysis, there is also a need to be more transpar-
ent and investigate the situational context in which the low
probability events occur. Due to the same factors mentioned
earlier, choosing a certain behavior profile for an AV may
adversely impact a segment of road-users, such as older peo-
ple or people with disability, disproportionately while keep-
ing the overall risk at a population level within a prescribed
threshold. Therefore, the use of behavior models in practi-
cal AV development needs to be accompanied with not only
the information about objective risk metrics but also how the
chosen behavior profile impacts vulnerable sections of road
users.
